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1. Introduction 
Over the last few years, there has been a growing interest in the institutional design of 
financial supervision. For policy-makers, the setting up, structuring and monitoring of 
prudential supervision has become a key priority since, at the latest, the global financial 
crisis.1 For economists, the mandate, organization and effects of newly established or enlarged 
financial supervision authorities have the potential to add to an already extensive literature on 
the optimal design of central banks. 
Empirical research on financial supervision authorities has mainly taken one of the 
following two routes. In one set of papers, the effect of financial supervision on outcomes 
(such as the stability of the banking sector) is examined. Examples include Masciandaro, 
Pansini, and Quintyn (2011), Dincer and Eichengreen (2012) and Caprio, D’Apice, Ferri, and 
Puopolo (2014). Another set of papers puts measures of financial supervision on the left-hand 
side of the regression equation, aiming to explore the determinants of a country’s supervisory 
structure. 
In this short paper, I examine empirically the institutional design of financial 
supervision. While previous studies often focus on macroeconomic and institutional country 
variables, typically including an ad hoc list of (potential) determinants, I focus on one specific 
country characteristic, the organizational structure of institutions. Specifically, I argue that 
political decisions concerning the specialization, subordination, delegation and coordination 
of financial supervision are heavily shaped by actual country experiences of organizing public 
and private activities. As a result, the design of prudential supervision should not be assessed 
in isolation but is interdependent with other relevant institutions. 
I explore this hypothesis using a panel data set that covers 98 countries over the period 
from 1999 to 2010. The panel allows to study differences in the regulatory framework both 
across countries and over time.2 A frequent challenge for the empirical analysis of financial 
                                                            
1 Frankel (2013) illustrates the widespread ignorance in (European) policy circles towards 
issues of financial regulation when discussing the fundamental problems of European 
monetary integration. He notes (p. 3): “Banking supervision was at best mentioned in passing 
in the 1990s. Almost no thought was given to the possibility of moving deposit insurance, 
supervision, or bank resolution, to the ECB level.” 
2 While institutional arrangements often turn out to be remarkably robust, it should be noted 
that countries have performed frequent adjustments on their supervisory structure over the 
sample period. At one extreme, the United Kingdom transferred competencies from the Bank 
of England (BoE) to a newly established Financial Services Authority (FSA) in 1998, while 
the majority of the FSA’s responsibilities were taken over by the BoE and two new regulators 
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supervision is the definition of measures of the institutional design of prudential supervision. 
In practice, the supervisory architecture can be assessed along various dimensions, including, 
the role of the central bank, the allocation of various types of supervision across institutions, 
and the features of those institutions, among others. I define variables that focus explicitly on 
the functions and responsibilities taken over by the central bank. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: the next section briefly discusses 
the relevant literature, followed by a description of the methodology and data. The heart of the 
paper is section 4 which presents and discusses the empirical results. Finally, a short summary 
concludes. 
 
2. Literature 
The empirical literature on the architecture of prudential supervision, dating back to 
Goodhart and Schoenmaker (1995) and sizably extended with a number of notable 
contributions by Donato Masciandaro, has grown considerably in magnitude over recent 
years. Instead of summarizing all empirical findings, I briefly focus on a few relevant studies. 
In an early analysis, Luna Martinez and Rose (2003) provide descriptive evidence, 
derived from a survey in 15 countries, on experiences in integrated financial sector 
supervision. They find, for instance, that there are differences in the perception of integration; 
practically all countries believe they have achieved a higher degree of harmonization in the 
regulation and supervision of banks and securities companies than between banks and 
insurance firms. They also identify advantages and disadvantages of establishing unified 
supervisory agencies. 
Dincer and Eichengreen (2012) examine empirically determinants of supervisory 
arrangements. Based on a sample of 89 countries, they examine the role of the central bank in 
prudential supervision, but they explore only a limited set of explanatory variables and do not 
focus explicitly on other institutional arrangements. 
In similar fashion, Melecky and Podpiera (2013) analyze various determinants of 
institutional structures of prudential and business conduct supervision of financial services. 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
in 2013; see Ferran (2011) for details. Parenthetically, I note that both of these switches are 
just outside my sample period. Masciandaro and Quintyn (2009) provide an extensive and 
more detailed assessment of reforms in supervisory regimes. 
3 
 
While their sample of regressors is large, including governance and central bank autonomy, 
their analysis is primarily exploratory. 
The paper that is perhaps most closely related to my analysis is Dalla Pellegrina, 
Masciandaro, and Pansini (2013). They study whether central bank independence and 
monetary policy arrangements can jointly influence the likelihood of policy-makers assigning 
banking supervision to central banks. They find some effects (e.g., stronger operational 
independence implies lesser supervisory powers). However, while their analysis is exclusively 
confined on institutional monetary settings (including the central bank), I take a much broader 
approach. 
 
3 Methodology and Data 
To examine whether the management and organization of (public) activities has an 
effect on the structure of financial supervision, I estimate regressions of the form: 
 
(1) FinSupervisionit = α + β OrgStructureit + γ · Zit + εit 
 
where FinSupervisionit is a measure of the supervisory architecture in country i at time t, 
OrgStructure is a measure of the country’s organizational structure outside supervision, Z 
denotes a vector of auxiliary conditioning variables, and εit is the residual. The coefficient of 
interest to me is β, which represents the partial effect of existing structures on supervision, 
ceteris paribus; consequently, to the extent that there is an association between a country’s 
broader organizational principles and its choice of arrangements for financial supervision is 
identifiable, the estimates of β can take different signs, depending on the relationship (and the 
definition of the variable) that is analyzed.3 
The data are taken from standard sources. Detailed information on the organizational 
structure of financial sector supervision are obtained from the World Bank; this data 
                                                            
3 An obvious concern in this type of literature is potential endogeneity. However, given the 
timing structure of the analysis, where financial supervision structures have been formally 
established only in recent years while a country’s organizational principles are likely to be 
relatively persistent, endogeneity is perhaps less of an issue here. 
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differentiates supervision by the type of intermediary (i.e., banks, insurances, or the capital 
market).4 Based on this data, I construct four different measures that aim to describe (and 
capture various aspects of) the role of the central bank in financial supervision 
(FinSupervision). A first measure, central bank as supervisor, is a binary dummy variable that 
takes the value of one if all supervisory tasks are allocated exclusively to the central bank 
(and zero otherwise); the supervisory functions are fully centralized in the central bank.5 The 
second measure offers a broader, somewhat more encompassing definition. This variable, 
central bank as co-supervisor, is again a binary dummy variable; it takes the value of one if at 
least some supervisory tasks are allocated to the central bank (and zero otherwise). In a third 
approach, I compute an index, central bank tasks, that reflects the number of supervisory tasks 
assigned to the central bank. This index ranges from 1 to 4, with a low value of 1 indicating 
that all functions are organized outside of the central bank, while a high value of 4 means that 
the central bank alone is responsible for prudential supervision. Finally, I compute an index, 
decentralization of supervision, that captures the extent to which the supervisory tasks are 
distributed across different authorities. This index takes values from 1 (concentration of 
responsibilities inside the central bank) to 5 (establishment of separate institutions for 
banking, insurance and securities supervision). 
Figure 1 plots the evolution of these measures over time. As shown, the role of the 
central bank in prudential supervision has, if anything, decreased until 2005; most notably, the 
range of functions and responsibilities assigned to the central bank has gradually declined. 
Since then, however, the trend has reversed, and central banks have again gained in 
importance. In contrast to this U-shaped pattern of central bank involvement, there has been a 
continuous tendency towards concentration of tasks in financial supervision, as shown in the 
graph in the lower right corner of Figure 1. 
Table 1 presents a correlation matrix of the measures of interest. The table shows that 
the correlation coefficients vary sizably, suggesting that the different measures indeed capture 
various aspects of the countries’ supervisory architectures. 
For the organizational structure of countries (OrgStructure), I borrow a wide range of 
measures from the literature. I start with central bank characteristics, for which I use central 
                                                            
4 The data are available online at 
http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTGLOBALFINREPORT/0,,c
ontentMDK:23267422~pagePK:64168182~piPK:64168060~theSitePK:8816097,00.html 
5 In the World Bank database, prudential supervision is labeled as ‘central bank’. 
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bank independence and central bank transparency; updated measures have been recently 
provided by Dincer and Eichengreen (2014). Next, I explore differences in the organization of 
firms across countries. Specifically, I apply the firm decentralization measure compiled by 
Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen (2012). I also experiment with Hofstede’s (2001) power 
distance rankings, which measure the perceptions of and the preferences for hierarchical 
relationships in a country. Finally, I use measures of fiscal decentralization, compiled by 
Arzaghi and Henderson (2005). 
For the additional conditioning variables, I refer to the analysis in Dincer and 
Eichengreen (2012). In particular, I consider three types of controls. For macroeconomic 
conditions, I use the (log of) GDP per capita (in constant international prices) and the average 
of CPI inflation in the previous ten years, both taken or constructed from the World Bank’s 
World Development Indicators. A country’s institutional background is captured by dummy 
variables for the origin of the legal code, taken from La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, and Shleifer 
(2008). I also follow Dincer and Eichengreen’s (2012) approach in controlling for measures 
from the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators database, although the individual 
variables are typically highly correlated. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
In the empirical analysis, I proceed stepwise. I begin with an analysis of standard 
country determinants of financial supervision. In particular, I review the set of explanatory 
variables that are proposed and used in Dincer and Eichengreen (2012). Table 2 presents the 
results. There are four columns; each column reports the result of a separate regression. 
Specifically, I tabulate separate estimation results for each of my four measures of the 
supervisory architecture as dependent variable. Since the categorical structure of the 
regressand differs, I also vary the estimation method. I use multinomial logit estimation for 
the first two regressands (which are binary dummy variables), while I apply an ordered probit 
estimator for the remaining two measures.6 
Reviewing the results, three findings appear particularly notable. First, of the two 
macroeconomic variables, only a country’s per capita income measurably affects the 
supervisory structure. Interestingly, the estimated coefficient takes a significantly negative 
                                                            
6 Whenever feasible, I also experimented with the additional inclusion of time fixed effects, 
without any notable effect. 
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value, indicating that richer countries tend to transfer supervisory functions and 
responsibilities from the central bank to other authorities; Dincer and Eichengreen (2012), in 
contrast, report a positive effect of per capita income on central banks with supervisory 
functions. Second, for the remaining institutional and governance measures, the findings 
differ sizably across columns, both in magnitude and significance, possibly due to 
multicollinearity. Finally, the standard determinants largely fail to reasonably explain the 
extent of decentralization of supervisory tasks. Perhaps in line with intuition, greater political 
instability and less effective governments are associated with a wider distribution of 
supervisory tasks across authorities. In the following, I will use these controls as nuisance 
variables, focusing exclusively on the variables of interest. 
In a first exercise, I examine the effect of central bank characteristics on the structure 
of financial supervision. In the empirical implementation, I explore two newly compiled index 
measures on the independence and transparency of central banks from Dincer and 
Eichengreen (2014). The results are reported in Table 3. As before, I tabulate estimation 
results for different measures of financial supervision across columns. I also experiment with 
various combinations of the control variables (gradually moving from the most parsimonious 
specification without any additional controls in the first panel to more demanding 
specifications in the lower panels), but for the sake of brevity I only report the coefficients of 
interest. 
The results in Table 3 turn out to be remarkably robust across the various 
specifications. Greater independence and transparency seems to be consistently associated 
with fewer supervisory functions for the central bank; the estimates of β take a significantly 
negative sign for most specifications in the first three columns of the table. A reasonable 
explanation for this finding is that governments have a preference for greater control of 
supervisory activities. The finding that dependent and opaque central banks are, on average, 
associated with greater decentralization of tasks is generally in line with this interpretation 
(column 4). 
Next, I explore the effect of the organization of firms in the private sector on the 
allocation of supervisory functions. Bloom, Sadun, and Van Reenen (2012) have collected 
data on the decentralization of investment, hiring, production, and sales decisions from 
corporate headquarters to local plant measures based on interviews. Unfortunately, however, 
this measure is available for only 12 countries; in none of these countries, the central bank 
alone is responsible for prudential supervision. 
7 
 
Table 4 presents the results. Again, the β estimates are often negative and statistically 
significant for measures of central bank responsibilities as regressand, indicating that 
decentralization at the firm level is associated with an allocation of supervisory functions 
outside the central bank. In principle, this finding may suggest that there is decentralization in 
both the private sector and the public sectors. For the measure of decentralization of 
prudential supervision, however, the estimated coefficient also takes a negative value, 
suggesting the opposite relationship, although the estimation results turn out to be not 
particularly robust. 
Figure 2 provides a scatter plot of the decentralization of supervision functions and 
firm decentralization in the year 2006 (the year the Bloom, Sadun, and Van Reenen survey 
was taken), illustrating the negative relationship. The empirical estimate is affected by Japan 
(and the United States) as outlier(s). 
In Table 5, I explore an alternative measure of firm organization, Hofstede’s (2001) 
power distance index. This index is defined to measure the extent to which the less powerful 
members of organizations and institutions accept and expect that power is distributed 
unequally. It is available for a much larger set of countries, but unlike the Bloom, Sadun, and 
Van Reenen (2012) measure it is defined such that low values reflect self-determination. As a 
result, the positive estimates of β confirm previous findings; greater power distance (and, 
therefore, organizational hierarchies) is associated with supervisory tasks in the hands of the 
central bank. As before, Figure 3 provides an accompanying scatter plot. 
In a final exercise, I examine the effect of fiscal decentralization on the structure of 
financial supervision. Arzaghi and Henderson (2005) construct a federalism index, based on 
nine indicators, that varies from zero to four. For this measure, however, the findings vary 
across measures and specifications. While some estimation results seem to suggest that fiscal 
decentralization is associated with greater dispersion of supervisory functions across 
authorities, the β coefficient switches its sign in the most demanding regression specification 
(with all nuisance controls). Interestingly, the association between fiscal decentralization and 
decentralization of supervision is, if anything, negative. For illustration, Figure 4 plots both 
decentralization measures. 
 
5. Conclusion 
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This paper studies the allocation of the functions and responsibilities of prudential 
supervision on public authorities, including the central bank. In particular, it is argued that 
there are interdependencies in the design of institutions; political decisions on the supervisory 
structure are not taken in isolation. Analyzing a panel data set of prudential supervision 
regimes in 98 countries over the period from 1999 to 2010, I find that central banks play a 
smaller role in supervision and tasks are more decentralized if the central bank is independent 
and transparent. Measures of firm and fiscal decentralization are typically associated with a 
greater centralization of supervisory functions outside of the central bank. 
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Figure 1: Quantifying the Institutional Structure of Financial Supervision 
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Figure 2: Decentralization of Firms and Financial Supervision, 2006 
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Figure 3: Hierarchies and Decentralization of Financial Supervision, 2004 
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Figure 4: Fiscal Decentralization and Decentralization of Financial Supervision, 1999 
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Table 1: Correlation Matrix 
 
 Central Bank 
as Supervisor 
Central Bank as 
Co-Supervisor 
Central Bank 
Tasks 
Decentralization 
of Supervision 
Central Bank as 
Supervisor 
1.00    
Central Bank as 
Co-Supervisor 
0.17 1.00   
Central Bank 
Tasks 
0.59 0.68 1.00  
Decentralization 
of Supervision 
-0.53 0.18 -0.17 1.00 
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Table 2: Standard Determinants of Financial Supervision 
 
Dependent variable CB as 
Supervisor 
CB as Co-
Supervisor 
CB Tasks Decentrali-
zation of 
Supervision 
Estimation method Logit Logit Ordered 
Probit 
Ordered 
Probit 
     
GDP per Capita -2.53** 
(0.56) 
-1.98** 
(0.25) 
-0.42** 
(0.25) 
 0.02 
(0.08) 
Past Inflation  0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.00 
(0.01) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
 0.01 
(0.00) 
Legal Origin UK -2.19** 
(0.72) 
 4.80** 
(0.51) 
 1.11** 
(0.11) 
 0.04 
(0.11) 
Legal Origin Germany -0.05 
(0.47) 
 0.04 
(0.28) 
-0.12 
(0.11) 
 0.11 
(0.11) 
Voice and Accountability -1.56** 
(0.46) 
 0.47* 
(0.23) 
-0.26** 
(0.08) 
 0.07 
(0.08) 
Political Stability  4.80** 
(0.88) 
 1.49** 
(0.21) 
 0.71** 
(0.08) 
-0.49** 
(0.08) 
Government Effectiveness  1.27 
(1.16) 
 1.07# 
(0.57) 
 0.47* 
(0.20) 
-0.53** 
(0.20) 
Regulatory Quality  3.17** 
(0.78) 
-1.36** 
(0.41) 
 0.52** 
(0.16) 
-0.16 
(0.16) 
Rule of Law -3.65** 
(0.97) 
 0.50 
(0.44) 
-1.02** 
(0.17) 
 0.25 
(0.17) 
Control of Corruption  1.90* 
(0.75) 
-1.71* 
(0.41) 
-0.15 
(0.15) 
 0.10 
(0.15) 
     
Number of Observations 790 790 790 790 
Pseudo R2 0.34 0.39 0.15 0.11 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. **, *, and # denotes significant at the 1, 5, and 10 
percent level, respectively. 
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Table 3: Financial Supervision and Central Bank Characteristics 
 
Dependent variable CB as 
Supervisor 
CB as Co-
Supervisor 
CB Tasks Decentrali-
zation of 
Supervision 
Estimation method Logit Logit Ordered 
Probit 
Ordered 
Probit 
 Without Additional Controls (# Obs=678) 
Central Bank Independence -1.57# 
(0.90) 
-1.92** 
(0.44) 
-1.12** 
(0.20) 
 0.90** 
(0.20) 
Central Bank Transparency -0.03 
(0.06) 
-0.31** 
(0.03) 
-0.12** 
(0.01) 
-0.10** 
(0.01) 
 With Macroeconomic Controls (612) 
Central Bank Independence -0.70 
(1.04) 
-3.09** 
(0.54) 
-1.16** 
(0.22) 
 0.06 
(0.22) 
Central Bank Transparency -0.06 
(0.08) 
-0.15** 
(0.04) 
-0.09** 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
 With Institutional Controls (670) 
Central Bank Independence  0.52 
(1.19) 
 0.77 
(0.57) 
 0.58* 
(0.27) 
 0.62* 
(0.26) 
Central Bank Transparency -0.07 
(0.06) 
-0.39** 
(0.04) 
-0.15** 
(0.02) 
-0.09** 
(0.01) 
 With Governance Controls (678) 
Central Bank Independence -2.64 
(6.20) 
-3.87** 
(0.60) 
-1.89** 
(0.25) 
 0.80** 
(0.24) 
Central Bank Transparency  0.85** 
(0.30) 
-0.12** 
(0.05) 
-0.06** 
(0.02) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
 With Macroeconomic, Institutional and Governance Controls 
(612) 
Central Bank Independence -34.7# 
(20.8) 
-2.02* 
(0.95) 
-0.76* 
(0.33) 
 0.74* 
(0.08) 
Central Bank Transparency  2.86* 
(1.42) 
-0.27** 
(0.06) 
-0.07** 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. **, *, and # denotes significant at the 1, 5, and 10 
percent level, respectively. 
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Table 4: Financial Supervision and Firm Organization 
 
Dependent variable CB as 
Supervisor 
CB as Co-
Supervisor 
CB Tasks Decentrali-
zation of 
Supervision 
Estimation method Logit Logit Ordered 
Probit 
Ordered 
Probit 
 Without Additional Controls (# Obs=144) 
Firm Decentralization – -1.99** 
(0.47) 
-0.82** 
(0.25) 
-1.21** 
(0.26) 
 With Macroeconomic Controls (144) 
Firm Decentralization – -2.16** 
(0.63) 
-0.94** 
(0.29) 
-0.62* 
(0.29) 
 With Institutional Controls (144) 
Firm Decentralization – -6.29** 
(1.27) 
-1.46** 
(0.31) 
-1.40** 
(0.28) 
 With Governance Controls (144) 
Firm Decentralization –  2.75* 
(1.36) 
 1.03** 
(0.49) 
-0.19 
(0.47) 
 With Macroeconomic, Institutional and Governance Controls 
(144) 
Firm Decentralization –  9.19 
(15.5) 
 1.11 
(0.72) 
-0.45 
(0.51) 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. **, *, and # denotes significant at the 1, 5, and 10 
percent level, respectively. 
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Table 5: Financial Supervision and Hierarchical Structures 
 
Dependent variable CB as 
Supervisor 
CB as Co-
Supervisor 
CB Tasks Decentrali-
zation of 
Supervision 
Estimation method Logit Logit Ordered 
Probit 
Ordered 
Probit 
 Without Additional Controls (# Obs=765) 
Power Distance Index  0.015* 
(0.007) 
 0.022** 
(0.004) 
 0.012** 
(0.002) 
 0.013** 
(0.002) 
 With Macroeconomic Controls (765) 
Power Distance Index  0.043** 
(0.010) 
 0.018** 
(0.005) 
 0.015** 
(0.002) 
 0.001 
(0.002) 
 With Institutional Controls (765) 
Power Distance Index  0.018* 
(0.008) 
 0.031** 
(0.004) 
 0.014** 
(0.002) 
 0.012** 
(0.002) 
 With Governance Controls (765) 
Power Distance Index  0.076** 
(0.016) 
 0.011* 
(0.005) 
 0.012** 
(0.003) 
 0.001 
(0.003) 
 With Macroeconomic, Institutional and Governance Controls 
(720) 
Power Distance Index  0.091** 
(0.017) 
 0.027** 
(0.006) 
 0.015** 
(0.003) 
-0.004 
(0.003) 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. **, *, and # denotes significant at the 1, 5, and 10 
percent level, respectively. 
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Table 6: Financial Supervision and Fiscal Decentralization 
 
Dependent variable CB as 
Supervisor 
CB as Co-
Supervisor 
CB Tasks Decentrali-
zation of 
Supervision 
Estimation method Logit Logit Ordered 
Probit 
Ordered 
Probit 
 Without Additional Controls (# Obs=456) 
Fiscal Decentralization  0.60 
(0.37) 
-0.31** 
(0.10) 
-0.13* 
(0.05) 
-0.28** 
(0.06) 
 With Macroeconomic Controls (420) 
Fiscal Decentralization -0.22 
(0.44) 
-0.02 
(0.13) 
-0.03 
(0.07) 
-0.15* 
(0.07) 
 With Institutional Controls (336/456) 
Fiscal Decentralization  0.59 
(0.39) 
-0.22* 
(0.11) 
-0.06 
(0.06) 
-0.22** 
(0.06) 
 With Governance Controls (456) 
Fiscal Decentralization -0.54 
(0.60) 
 0.13 
(0.15) 
-0.21** 
(0.08) 
-0.10 
(0.08) 
 With Macroeconomic, Institutional and Governance Controls 
(300/420) 
Fiscal Decentralization  2.49 
(1.59) 
 1.11** 
(0.24) 
 0.38 
(0.09) 
-0.03 
(0.09) 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. **, *, and # denotes significant at the 1, 5, and 10 
percent level, respectively. 
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Appendix 1: Countries in Sample 
Albania 
Algeria 
Argentina 
Armenia 
Australia 
Austria 
Azerbaijan 
Belarus 
Belgium 
Bolivia 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Botswana 
Brazil 
Bulgaria 
Canada 
Chile 
China 
Colombia 
Costa Rica 
Croatia 
Cuba 
Cyprus 
Czech Republic 
Denmark 
Dominican Republic   
Ecuador 
Egypt 
El Salvador 
Estonia 
Finland 
France 
Georgia 
Germany 
Greece 
Guatemala 
Honduras 
Hong Kong 
Hungary 
Iceland 
India 
Indonesia 
Iran, Islamic Rep.  
Ireland 
Israel 
Italy 
Jamaica  
Japan 
Jordan 
Kazakhstan 
Korea, Rep. 
Latvia 
Lebanon 
Lithuania 
Luxembourg 
Macedonia, FYR   
Malaysia 
Malta 
Mauritius 
Mexico 
Moldova 
Montenegro 
Morocco 
Namibia 
Netherlands 
New Zealand 
Nicaragua 
Nigeria 
Norway 
Pakistan 
Panama 
Peru   
Philippines 
Poland 
Portugal 
Romania 
Russian Federation 
Saudi Arabia 
Serbia 
Singapore 
Slovak Republic 
Slovenia 
South Africa 
Spain 
Sri Lanka 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Syrian Arab Republic 
Thailand 
Trinidad and Tabago 
Tunisia 
Turkey 
Ukraine 
United Arab Emirates 
United Kingdom 
United States 
Uruguay 
Venezuela, RB 
Vietnam 
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